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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on rural-urban migration decisions in developing
countries. Using original survey data from rural India, we show that seasonal migrants
prefer to earn 35 percent less on local public works rather than incur the cost of mi-
grating. Structural estimates suggest that the ﬁxed cost of migration is small, and
can be entirely explained by travel costs and income risk. In contrast, the ﬂow cost
of migration is very high. We argue that higher living costs in the city explain only a
small part of the ﬂow cost of migration, and that most of it is non-monetary.
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1 Introduction
The recent economic literature has documented large average labor productivity gaps be-
tween rural and urban areas of developing countries (Gollin et al., 2014; Young, 2013). The
source of these gaps, which has important implications for economic growth and develop-
ment policy, is hotly debated. One possible explanation is that mobility frictions, such as
transportation costs, prevent workers from being optimally allocated across sectors (Gollin
et al., 2014; Bryan and Morten, 2017). Another is that the most productive workers sort into
urban areas, so that despite large average wage gaps returns to migrating for the marginal
worker are close to zero (Young, 2013; Hicks et al., 2017).
Providing evidence on the source of rural-urban labor productivity gaps is challenging.
First, rural and urban workers are diﬀerent along observable and unobservable characteristics,
so that rural workers may not gain from moving to the city even if urban workers earn more.
Second, rural and urban workers do diﬀerent types of jobs (e.g. farming and factory work),
which makes it hard to compare labor productivity in the village and in the city. Third,
living costs are usually higher in urban than in rural aras, so that nominal comparisons
may be misleading. Finally, rural workers who move to urban areas may have to pay a risk
premium, e.g. they face the risk of being unemployed (Harris and Todaro, 1970).
To shed light on the nature of rural-urban wage gaps, we exploit original survey data on
seasonal migrants in India who choose between construction work in the city and employment
on public works in the village. This unique context allows us to observe the same person
doing the same type of work in the same season either in the city or in the village. We measure
the value of time in the village and in the city by comparing daily migration earnings and
daily wages on public works. We build deﬂators based on migrants' actual living conditions
at destination. And we compute the distribution of potential earnings and the implied risk
premium, based on variation in seasonal migration earnings within worker across years.
We ﬁrst provide reduced form evidence that when oﬀered employment on local public
works, most seasonal migrants choose to stay in the village for a 35 percent lower wage. This
suggests rural-urban wage gaps may be large for a given worker, but migration costs are
larger. We then use a structural approach to quantify these costs. We show that the ﬁxed
cost of migration is small: neither transportation costs nor unemployment risk are signiﬁcant
barriers to migration. Higher living costs only have a small impact on migrants, who consume
little in the city. We argue that a large part of migration costs is non-monetary: the disutility
of harsh living and working conditions in the city is the main barrier to migration.
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The study of seasonal migration requires dedicated survey data: we use original data
collected in a high out-migration area located at the border of three Indian states (Rajasthan,
Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat).1 Our analysis proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step,
we exploit variation in employment provision under India's rural workfare program, the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) across seasons and states to estimate
its eﬀect on seasonal migration. We argue that this variation reﬂects exogenous constraints
on employment provision, rather than diﬀerences in demand for NREGA work. We ﬁnd
that availability of NREGA work has a strong negative eﬀect on seasonal migration: in
Rajasthan during the summer, the average adult worked eight more days on local public
works and migrated seven fewer days. The migration response is present at the extensive
margin (workers are 5.5 percentage points less likely to migrate) and the intensive margin
(migration trips are shorter by seven days).
Utility costs associated with migration need to be large for migrants to prefer NREGA
work which pays 35 percent less than daily earnings outside of the village. In the second step,
we estimate a structural model which includes both a ﬂow cost and a ﬁxed cost of migration
to ﬁt the reduced form evidence. The estimated ﬁxed cost of migration, on the one hand,
is relatively small, about 7 percent of total migration earnings. Travel costs reported by
migrants make for a quarter of this cost. We compute a risk premium, based on the variance
of earnings within migrant across years, and ﬁnd that income risk may explain the rest of
the ﬁxed cost. The estimated ﬂow cost of migration, on the other hand, is large, about 80
percent of daily migration earnings. Using detailed information on migrants' trips, we ﬁnd
that higher living costs at destination can only explain a small share of the ﬂow cost. We
argue that non-monetary costs of living and working in the city must play an important role
in migrants' decision to stay in the village. These costs seem to be higher for more educated
and older migrants, and for migrants who went to destinations where crime is high.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we measure net beneﬁts of
migration for the same worker performing a similar task in and outside of the village. This
helps overcome selection issues which plague the debate on rural-urban wage gaps in devel-
oping countries. Some authors interpret average diﬀerences in real wages, or productivity per
worker between rural and urban areas as evidence of signiﬁcant barriers to migration (Gollin
et al., 2014; Bryan and Morten, 2017). In contrast, Young (2013) argues that the entire
gap can be explained by the fact that production in urban areas is more skill intensive and
attracts more skilled workers. Hicks et al. (2017) also ﬁnd little income gains for workers who
1The data was collected by Diane Coﬀey, John Papp and Dean Spears (Coﬀey et al., 2015).
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settle down in urban areas. Our contribution is to show that the same worker in the same
season can earn 35 percent more on urban private construction sites than on local public
works but still prefers to stay in the village. We ﬁnd that the disutility of migration is high,
and that diﬀerences in living costs and income risk are a small part of it. This suggests that
rural-urban wage gaps do exist in expectation and in real terms, and rural workers choose
not to take advantage of them.
Second, we use demand for employment on public works among migrants to shed light
on the determinants of migration decisions in developing countries. The literature highlights
the importance of ﬁnancial constraints, and reliance on village-based insurance networks
(Angelucci, 2015; Bazzi, 2017; Kleemans, 2015; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016; Morten, 2019).
Bryan et al. (2014) argue that the risk of failed migration and the lack of information prevent
rural workers from taking full advantage of seasonal migration opportunities, which could
bring signiﬁcant income and consumption gains. Our contribution is to show that in a context
where information on migration opportunities is widespread, migrants prefer to stay back
and shorten their trips for a much lower wage on local public works. A structural estimation
shows that migration costs need to be large to rationalize this ﬁnding, and that these costs
are variable rather than ﬁxed. We ﬁnd that higher living costs at destination, travel costs,
and even the risk associated with migration earnings are a small part of migration costs in
this context. We argue that leaving the village has a high non-monetary cost for migrants,
which could reﬂect a preference for staying in the village (home bias) or diﬃcult living and
working conditions at destination.2
Third, we present new causal evidence on the eﬀect of workfare programs on private sector
employment. Workfare programs are a popular form of safety nets, present in 94 countries in
2014 (The World Bank, 2015). The existing evidence is mixed and focuses on local impacts
(Zimmermann, 2012; Imbert and Papp, 2015; Muralidharan et al., 2017; Berg et al., 2018).3
Some studies have argued that India's NREGA might provide an alternative to seasonal
migration (Jacob, 2008; Ashish and Bhatia, 2009; Morten, 2019). This paper provides the
ﬁrst causal evidence of NREGA's impact on rural-to-urban migration using a dedicated
survey and a border discontinuity design. We show that workfare programs operating during
the agricultural oﬀ-season may have a signiﬁcant negative impact on employment outside of
the village. In a follow-up paper, we build on this ﬁnding and study the spatial equilibrium
2In a recent re-evaluation of the Bryan et al. (2014) experiment, Lagakos et al. (2018) also argue that the
welfare gains from migration may be limited by a large non-monetary cost of migration.
3India's NREGA being the largest workfare program in the world, has attracted more attention,
but(Beegle et al., 2017) and Alik-Lagrange et al. (2017) study public works programs in other contexts.
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eﬀects of the NREGA on urban labor markets across India (Imbert and Papp, 2016).4 Since
migrants forgo much higher earnings in the city, our results imply that the program reduces
household income. Hence, a complete welfare analysis of the program needs to include
not only forgone earning opportunities in the private sector (Imbert and Papp, 2015, for
example), but also the non-monetary costs of these alternatives.
The following section describes the workfare program and presents the data set used in
the paper. Section 3 uses variation in public employment provision across states and seasons
to estimate the impact of the program on short-term migration. Section 4 uses a structural
model of migration decisions and detailed information on migration trips to provide evidence
on the costs and beneﬁts of seasonal migration.
2 Context and data
2.1 NREGA
This paper studies India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which
entitles every household in rural India to 100 days of work per year at a state-level minimum
wage. The NREGA is the largest workfare program in the world: in 2016-17 it provided 2.36
billion person-days of employment to 51 million households.5 For identiﬁcation, this paper
will use variation in NREGA work across states and seasons to estimate its eﬀect on seasonal
migration. We provide here some general information about the source of this variation.
NREGA implementation is highly heterogeneous across states (Dreze and Khera, 2009;
Dreze and Oldiges, 2009). As Figure 1 shows, the number of days spent on public works by
the average rural adult ranges from almost zero in Haryana (HR) to 12 in Andhra Pradesh
(AP). Days spent on public works also vary widely across the three states of our study:
Rajasthan (RJ) provides 11 days of public works employment per adult, Madhya Pradesh
(MP) 2.6 days, and Gujarat (GJ) 1.4 days.6 Imbert and Papp (2016) show that cross-state
diﬀerences in NREGA implementation cannot be explained by diﬀerences in socio-economic
characteristics. Dutta et al. (2012) argue that they do not reﬂect underlying demand for
NREGA work, but some combination of political will, administrative capacity, and previous
4As compared to this paper, Imbert and Papp (2016) rely on NSS data, which has the advantage of being
nationally representative, but lacks important information on migration trips, including duration, location,
unemployment and earnings, and hence does not allow one to study migration costs.
5Figures are from the oﬃcial NREGA website nrega.nic.in.
6Authors' calculations based on the National Sample Survey Organization (NSS) Employment-
Unemployment survey Round 66.
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experience in providing public works.
Employment provision under the NREGA also varies within the year. Public works are
often closed at the time of the monsoon (July) and reopen after the main harvest (December).
As a result, most NREGA employment is provided during the ﬁrst half of the year. The
seasonality of NREGA works is driven by both practical and political considerations. Most
NREGA works are construction projects, which are diﬃcult to carry out during the heavy
monsoon rains. Also, local governments in charge of NREGA implementation tend to avoid
competing with demand for work in agriculture (Association for Indian Development, 2009).
As Figure 2 shows, in 2009-10, public employment per rural household is the lowest between
July to September, which is the peak agricultural season, and highest between April and
June, which is the agricultural oﬀ-season.7
Work under the act is short-term, often on the order of a few weeks per adult. Households
with at least one member employed under the act during agricultural year 2009-10 report
a mean of only 38 days of work and a median of 30 days for all members of the household
during that year, which is well below the guaranteed 100 days. Work under the program is
rationed (Dutta et al., 2012): during the agricultural year 2009-10, an estimated 19 percent
of Indian households reported attempting to get work under the act without success.8 The
rationing rule is at the discretion of local oﬃcials: workers are recruited rather than applying
for work (The World Bank, 2011). Also, since work is provided only to households who are
registered in the village council (Gram Panchayat), workers cannot migrate to another village
- let alone another state - to participate in the NREGA.
2.2 Survey Design
Our analysis draws from a survey collected in 2010 by Diane Coﬀey, John Papp and Dean
Spears (Coﬀey et al., 2015). Appendix Figure 3 shows the location of the 70 sample villages.
The selection of sample villages proceeded in three steps. First, we selected four neighboring
districts: one in Rajasthan, one in Gujarat and two in Madhya Pradesh. The survey location
was chosen because previous studies in the area reported high rates of out-migration and
poverty (Mosse et al., 2002), and because surveying along the border of the three states
provided variation in state-level policies. Second, we matched villages in Rajasthan with
villages across the border in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh based on seven criteria measured
in the 2001 census: distance, fraction of Scheduled Castes (SC), fraction of Scheduled Tribes
7Authors' calculations based on the NSS Employment-Unemployment survey Round 66.
8Author's calculations based on the NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey Round 66.
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(ST), cultivated area, irrigated and non-irrigated cultivated area and population per culti-
vated area.9 Finally, we selected the 25 best matches along the Madhya Pradesh border and
the 10 best matches along the Gujarat border to be part of the survey sample.10 As Panel
A of Table 1 shows, this procedure ensured that village pairs were well balanced along these
dimensions.
The survey itself consisted of three modules: village, household, and adult modules. The
household module was completed by the household head or other knowledgeable member.
One-on-one interviews were attempted with each adult aged 14 to 69 in each household.
The analysis in this paper focuses mostly on those adults who completed the full one-on-one
interviews. In order to maximize response rates, the survey was carried out between the end
of June and the beginning of September, which is the time when migrants come back for
the start of the agricultural peak season, and multiple visits were made to households whose
members were away. Out of 2,722 adults aged 14-69, we were able to complete face-to-face
interviews with 2,224 (81.7 percent). For the 498 remaining individuals, the head of the
household provided the information about their employment and migration spells in the last
year. The adults that we were unable to survey personally are diﬀerent from adults that
were interviewed: they were much more likely to have migrated all three seasons of the year,
and much less likley to have ever done NREGA work (see Appendix Table A.1). We choose
not to use the information on these 498 individuals in our main speciﬁcation to maximize
the accuracy of our estimates, but include it later as a robustness check. The results on the
full 2,722 sample are similar both qualitatively and quantitatively (see Appendix Table A.7).
To assess how the adults in our sample compare with the rural population in India,
Column 5 in appendix Table A.1 presents means from the rural sample of the nationally
representative NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey. Literacy rates are substantially
lower in the study sample compared with India as a whole, reﬂecting the fact that the study
area is a particularly poor area of rural India. The NSS asks only one question about short-
term migration, which is whether an individual spent between 30 and 180 days away from
the village for work within the past year. Based on this measure, adults in our sample are 28
percentage points more likely to be short-term migrants than adults in India as a whole. Part
of this diﬀerence may be due to the fact that the survey instrument was speciﬁcally designed
to pick up short-term migration, though most of the diﬀerence is more likely due to the fact
that the sample is drawn from a high out-migration area. Column 6 in Table A.1 shows the
9Village characteristics used for matching were measured in the 2001 census, before the NREGA.
10The best matches were pairs with the lowest sum of squared distances over the seven criteria.
7
short-term migration rate is 16 percent for the four districts chosen for the migration survey
according to NSS, which is half the mean in sample villages (30 percent) but well above the
all-India average (2 percent).
The survey instrument was speciﬁcally designed to measure migration, cultivation, and
participation in the NREGA, which are all highly seasonal. Respondents were much more
familiar with seasons than calendar months: summer is mid-March through mid-July, the
monsoon season is mid-July through mid-November, and winter is mid-November through
mid-March. The survey was implemented at the end of the summer and beginning of the
monsoon 2010, when most seasonal migrants come back to work in agriculture. Surveyors
asked retrospective questions to each household member about each activity separately for
summer 2010, winter 2009-10, monsoon 2009, and summer 2009.
2.3 Demand and Supply of NREGA Work
Two important variables for the following analysis are whether an individual worked for the
NREGA, and whether they would have liked to do more NREGA work during a particular
season. Speciﬁcally, we asked if more NREGA work were available during [season] would
you work more? for individuals who had worked for the NREGA. For individuals who
did not work for the NREGA, we asked did you want to work for the NREGA during
[season]? One should be skeptical that the answer to these questions truly indicates a
person's willingness to work. Column 1 in Appendix Table A.2 shows that the correlations
between the response to the resulting measure of demand and respondent characteristics
are sensible. Across all seasons, demand for NREGA was lower for adults with secondary
education and for older respondents, but higher for adults who were married and came from
poorer families (kuccha roof). Members of families who depend on farming were less likely
to declare that they wanted NREGA work during the peak agricultural season (monsoon).
Other work opportunities, studies, and illness were the the main reasons given by respondents
who did not want NREGA work.
Table 2 presents NREGA demand and participation across states and seasons. As ex-
pected, demand for NREGA work was higher during the summer (80 percent) and the
winter season (75 percent), when work opportunities are scarce, and lower during the peak
agricultural season (54 percent). Demand was uniformly high across states: 79 percent of re-
spondents in Gujarat, 82 percent in Madhya Pradesh and 83 percent in Rajasthan said they
would have liked to do NREGA work during the summer 2009. Strikingly, actual NREGA
work provision did not follow demand patterns. Most NREGA work was provided in the
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summer (11 days per adult), and very little in the winter (1 day per adult), when demand
was equally high. During the summer 2009, Rajasthan villages provided 16 NREGA days
per adult, as compared to seven days in villages just across the border, where demand was
just as high. Hence, as in the rest of India, demand for NREGA work in the survey sample
was heavily rationed: the proportion of respondents who said they wanted work but did not
work ranged from 33 percent in Rajasthan to 69 percent in Gujarat in the summer, and was
highest in the winter (75 percent in all states). Survey respondents mentioned the closure of
worksites and the inaction of village oﬃcials as the main reasons for why they they did not
work for NREGA when they wanted to, suggesting the restriction was supply-related rather
than demand-related (see Appendix Table A.3). The assumption that variation in NREGA
work is exogenous to local economic conditions will be crucial for our identiﬁcation strategy.
2.4 Migration Patterns
In the survey, migration is deﬁned as spending more than two nights away from the village
for work or looking for work. Table 2 presents migration rates across states and seasons.
Migration is high during the summer, from mid-March to mid-July (35 percent), low during
the monsoon, from mid-July to mid-November, which is also the peak agricultural season (10
percent), and high again in the winter, from mid-November onward (29 percent). Column
2 in Appendix Table A.2 presents the correlates of migration. Migrants are more likely to
be male, they are younger and have lower education than the average respondent. They are
also more likely to come from families that are poorer, have a house with earthen ﬂoor, have
less land, and whose main income source is not farming.
In order to assess the costs of migration, we require reliable information on what migrants
do and how much they earn. Given the short-term nature of most migrant jobs, the same
migrant might work for multiple employers for diﬀerent wages and make multiple trips within
the same season. For this reason, the survey instrument included questions about earnings,
wages, and jobs for each trip within the past four seasons up to a maximum of four trips. In
total, this yields detailed observations for 2,749 trips taken by 1,125 adults.11 In 95 percent
of the cases, migrants report only one trip per season. For those who have done multiple
trips, we calculate the average trip characteristic for each migrant for each season that the
migrant was away, using trip duration as weight. Finally, we take into account the possibility
11One important downside of asking respondents about their four most recent trips, is that we do not have
detailed information on trips done in earlier seasons for people who migrated more than four times in the
last year. This is the case of 200 adults (out of 768) who migrated in the summer 2009. For them we only
know that they migrated, with whom and for how long.
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that migrants do not always ﬁnd work at destination by using earnings per day away, rather
than earnings per day worked as our main measure of migration returns.12
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 3 present descriptive information about short-term migration
trips based on the survey. Most short-term migrants travel with a family member (71 percent
in the summer). They travel relatively long distances (300km on average during the summer)
for a relatively cheap fare (Rs. 116 for the summer), and a large majority works in construc-
tion in urban areas in a diﬀerent state. Figure 4 illustrates the remarkable geographical
spread of their trips. The ﬁgure also shows that migrants from Rajasthan travel to the same
destinations as migrants from the other two states: this will be important in our analysis,
because it suggests that migrants from diﬀerent states face the same labor demand (in the
private sector). Employer-employee relationships are often short-term: only 37 percent of
summer migrants knew their employer or labor contractor before leaving the village. Living
arrangements at destination are rudimentary, with about 85 percent of migrants reporting
having no formal shelter (often a bivouac on the work-site itself). Most migrants do only
one trip, and they stay on average 50 to 60 days - half of the season - at destination. Table 3
shows that migrants are close to full employment. They work on average six days per week
spent at destination. They earn on average Rs. 5,666 in total, that is Rs. 118 per day worked
or Rs. 101 per day away, which means that their travel cost is recouped in one day of work.
Column 4 presents national averages and Column 5 presents averages in the four districts
of the survey sample according to NSS data. Migration patterns are similar along the few
dimensions measured in both surveys.
2.5 Eﬀect of NREGA on Migration: Descriptive Evidence
Before providing causal evidence of the program eﬀect on migration, we describe the corre-
lation between demand for NREGA work, program participation and short-term migration
(Table 2). Adults who migrated during the summer 2009 were less likely to have worked for
NREGA than the whole sample (35 percent against 40 percent), but they were also more
likely to say that they would have liked to do NREGA work during that season without
being able to (55 percent against 42 percent). Hence, on the whole, demand for NREGA
work was higher among migrants (89 percent against 82 percent), which is consistent with
the idea that the NREGA competes with seasonal migration. Table 2 also provides descrip-
tive evidence that higher NREGA work provision is associated with lower migration. The
proportion of adults who declared they stopped migrating because of NREGA in the sum-
12Appendix A describes the construction of the earnings measures in more detail.
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mer increases from 3 percent in Gujarat to 8 percent in Madhya Pradesh and 10 percent in
Rajasthan (Panel A). This fraction is negligible in the other seasons (Panel B and C). In
the following sections, we use variation in NREGA employment provision across states and
seasons to estimate the causal eﬀect of the program on seasonal migration and to quantify
migration costs.
3 Program eﬀect on migration: reduced form evidence
3.1 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the impact of the NREGA on days spent outside the village we exploit
the variation in program implementation across states and compare Rajasthan with Gujarat
and Madhya Pradesh. We also take advantage of the seasonality of public employment
provision and compare the summer months, when most employment is provided, to the rest
of the year. The estimating equation is:
Yis = α + β0Raji + β1Sums + β2Raji ∗ Sums + γ0Xi + γ1Xi ∗ Sums + εis (1)
where Yis is the outcome for adult i in season s, Raji is a dummy variable equal to one if the
adult lives in Rajasthan, Sums is a dummy variable equal to one for the summer season (mid-
March to mid-July) and Xi are controls. The vector Xi includes all worker characteristics
(gender, age, education, marital status, language skills), households characteristics (size,
religion, caste, wealth), and village controls (population and connectivity) listed in Table 1, as
well as village pair ﬁxed eﬀects. We interact the vector of controlsXi with the summer season
dummy, to allow worker, household or village characteristics to aﬀect outcomes diﬀerently
in the summer and in the other seasons. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
In order for β2 to identify the impact of the NREGA, villages in Rajasthan need to
be comparable with their match on the other side of the border in all respects other than
NREGA implementation. Potential threats to our identiﬁcation strategy include diﬀerences
in socio-economic conditions or state policies other than NREGA. Table 1 compares village,
households and individual characteristics in villages in Rajasthan with matched villages in
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh and village pairs in Rajasthan. SC/ST population, land use
are balanced by design (Panel A). As Panel B shows, other village characteristics, such as
population size, access with paved road and distance to town are also balanced. However,
villages in Rajasthan are less likely to have education facilities, or beneﬁt from bus services
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(Panel B), and households are less likely to have electricity (Panel C). This suggests that the
policy mix in Rajasthan may include better NREGA implementation but lower infrastructure
provision. We will control for these variables in the analysis. Socio-economic characteristics
are very comparable otherwise on either side of the Rajasthan border, a half depends on
farming for subsistance, with many households living in houses with dirt ﬂoor and thatch
roof (Panel C). Literacy rates (Panel A) and education levels (Panel D) are also very similar.
3.2 Results
Table 4 presents our results on the causal eﬀect of the program on migration. We ﬁrst use
days worked for the NREGA in each season as an outcome and estimate Equation 1. Column
1 conﬁrms that no public employment was provided outside of the summer months, and there
is no diﬀerence between Rajasthan and the other states. During the summer 2009, adults
in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, worked about seven days for the NREGA. The coeﬃcient
on the interaction of Rajasthan and summer suggests that in Rajasthan nine more days of
public employment were provided per adult. The estimated coeﬃcient declines slightly after
including controls and village pair ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 2).
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 repeat the same analysis with days spent outside the village
for work as the dependent variable. The average adult spent 11 days away for work during
the monsoon and the winter 2009, and there is again no diﬀerence between Rajasthan and
the other states. In contrast, in the summer 2009 adults in Rajasthan villages spent ﬁve fewer
days on average working outside the village than their counterparts in Gujarat and Madhya
Pradesh, who were away for 24 days on average. The estimated coeﬃcient becomes more
negative (-6.6 days) with the inclusion of village pair ﬁxed eﬀects, of village, household and
worker controls. Taken together, the estimates suggest that one additional day of NREGA
work reduces migration by 0.6 to 0.8 days.
Columns 5-6 and 7-8 in Table 4 decompose the migration response along the extensive
and intensive margin, respectively. The probability of migration during the summer 2009
was 6.4p.p. lower in Rajasthan villages, a 16 percent reduction as compared to the 40 percent
migration rate in villages across the border. Conditional on migrating, adults in Rajasthan
villages migrated 5.5 fewer days than adults in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages, who
migrated 60 days on average. As before, in the seasons when NREGA provision is low, we
observe no diﬀerences in migration rates (20 percent) or migration duration (53 days) across
states. The estimates are very similar once we include controls: the eﬀect on the extensive
margin decreases (5.5p.p) and the eﬀect on the intensive margin increases (7 days).
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We next perform a number of robustness checks. First, to make sure the identifying
variation comes from exogenous variation in supply of NREGA work and not from endoge-
nous variation in demand, we add to Xi a dummy variable for whether the adult did or
wanted work during the summer 2009. The estimates remain perfectly stable (see Appendix
Table A.4). Second, to ensure that workers in Rajasthan are comparable to workers on the
other side of the border, we estimate a propensity score for living in Rajasthan based on all
the controls from Table 1 and restrict the sample to observations on the common support.
As Appendix Table A.5 shows, diﬀerences in NREGA days worked become slightly smaller,
and as a result the negative eﬀect on migration duration is a bit smaller, but the results
overall are very similar. Third, we estimate the same speciﬁcation without the pairs that
include Gujarat villages, which have starkly diﬀerent levels of NREGA provision and may
hence be less comparable with Rajasthan villages. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients of in-
terest increases slightly (see Appendix Table A.6). As a fourth robustness check, we repeat
the same analysis including adults who were not interviewed personally but about whom
information was collected from the household head. The coeﬃcients in Appendix Table A.7
are again similar, just slightly smaller: adults who were not interviewed personally are less
likely to participate in NREGA, and hence their migration behavior is less aﬀected.
Despite the robustness of our results, one may still worry that diﬀerences we observe in
migration patterns between Rajasthan villages and the others might be due to preexisting
diﬀerences unrelated to the NREGA. To alleviate this concern, we provide two additional
pieces of evidence. First, we compare the number of long-term migrants across states, i.e.
individuals who changed residence and left the household in the last ﬁve years. The results in
Appendix Table A.8 show that there is no diﬀerence in permanent migration levels between
Rajasthan and the other states. Second, the survey included retrospective questions about
migration trips in previous years. Unfortunately, the fraction of respondents who forgot
whether they migrated ﬁve and six years ago is high: 22 percent for 2005 and 47 percent for
2004. Using non-missing responses however, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in migration
levels in 2004 and 2005, i.e. before the NREGA was implemented (see Appendix Figure A.1).
3.3 Nominal Wage Gaps
Our empirical results suggest that migrants shorten their trips, and sometimes stop migrating
altogether to work for the NREGA. One would hence expect NREGA work to be more
proﬁtable than migration. Table 5 compares migrants' earnings per day spent outside the
village with daily wages on NREGA work sites for adults who worked outside of the village
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in the summer 2009. The construction of these variables is described in detail in Section 2.4
and Appendix A, but we will emphasize here two important points. First, we use earnings
per day migrated, and not per day worked at destination to account for the possibility that
migrants do not ﬁnd work. In practice, however, as we saw in Table 3 migrants in our sample
are close to full employment, and work on average six days a week. Second, for migrants
who did not actually work for the NREGA in that season, we predict NREGA wages using a
linear regression of NREGA daily earnings of those who work on individual, household and
village characteristics (see Appendix Table A.9). The mean of predicted and actual NREGA
wages are extremely close, which is due to the fact that the NREGA wage is for the most
part ﬁxed by state law, and that NREGA participation is driven by supply of work rather
than demand factors.
For the average migrant in the summer 2009, earnings outside of the village were 37
percent higher than earnings on NREGA work sites (Column 1). Column 2 presents the
wage gap for the minority of migrants who did not want NREGA work in that season. For
them the diﬀerence between migration and NREGA earnings is much higher than the average
(46%), which is consistent with the idea that migrants arbitrage the beneﬁts of migration
against the opportunity to do NREGA work in the village. In contrast, the wage gap for
migrants who did NREGA work in that season is slightly lower than the average (35 percent),
but still very substantial (Column 3). In Column 4, we show the wage gap for migrants who
would have likely prefered to stay in the village and do NREGA work rather than migrate,
either because they did NREGA work or they said they would have wanted to do NREGA
work. The wage gap for them is also 35 percent, the same as for migrants who actually did
NREGA work, which is consistent with our argument that NREGA participation is supply
and not demand-driven. Overall, these wage patterns suggest that earnings outside of the
village are much higher than earnings from NREGA work in nominal terms. For migrants
to prefer NREGA work to migrating, migration costs need to be high. The following section
quantiﬁes these costs and explore their monetary and non-monetary components.
4 Migration Costs
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section suggests that rural workers prefer
to stay and earn a much lower wage rather than go and earn in the city. In this section we
develop a simple model of migration choice and NREGA participation. We then estimate
migration costs structurally to match observed migration patterns and the reduced form
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evidence of the program impact from the previous section.
4.1 Theoretical framework
Let us consider a rural worker during the oﬀ-peak season of agriculture (summer), who splits
their time T between time spent migrating Lm and time spent at home T −Lm. Time spent
at home has value f(T −Lm), with f(.) increasing and concave. The value of each day spent
migrating is (wm − cv) where wm denotes daily earnings from migration and cv is a ﬂow
cost of migration. cv represents the costs of living and working at destination. To migrate,
workers pay a ﬁxed cost cf , which represents the cost of travel and migration arrangements
(e.g. transportation). Time spent outside the village Lm maximizes:
max
Lm∈[0,T ]
U = f(T − Lm) + (wm − cv)Lm − cf1{Lm > 0}
For any interior solution Lm > 0, the optimal period of time spent migrating is L
∗
m such
that:
f ′(T − L∗m) = wm − cv
The model assumes that the utility function is linear in earnings and that there is no leisure
choice. More generally, one could think of f(T − L∗m) as capturing utility from time spent
in the village after the individual has optimally chosen work outside of the village Lm and
leisure given a time constraint of T . The model also assumes that migration earnings are a
linear function of time spent at destination. One may expect migrants who commit to go for
longer periods to earn more per day, or migrants who go for shorter periods to spend time
without pay looking for jobs. We check that daily earnings are independent of migration
duration in the data: Appendix Figure A.2 shows that this is indeed the case.
There is no explicit role for risk in the model, as earning at home or at destination are
perfectly anticipated. This may be a plausible assumption for time spent at home, since we
focus on the summer months, in which climatic conditions or other hazards (such as pests)
which inﬂuence agricultural productivity during the rest of the year are less prevalent. It is
however highly unlikely that migration earnings are ﬁxed in advance, given that two thirds of
migrants do not even know their employer before leaving the village (see Table 3). A simple
way to include risk considerations in the model is to assume that the decision to migrate
is based on expected earnings and that actual earnings depend on an idiosynchratic shock
realized once migrants are at destination. In that case the utility cost of uncertainty can be
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captured by a risk premium, which is part of the ﬁxed migration cost cf .
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We next introduce the employment guarantee scheme, which oﬀers Lg days of employment
on public works paying wg per day. We assume that Lg is small relative to the usual duration
of migration trips (Lg < L
∗
m) and ﬁxed, i.e. workers may choose whether or not to participate
in the program but not the number of days they work. These assumptions are consistent
with the fact that demand for NREGA work is rationed and that in our survey, adults who
worked for NREGA worked on average 28 days, while adults who migrated were away on
average 60 days. Under these assumptions, the marginal value of time for workers who
migrate and participate in the program remains (wm − cv) and their migration duration is
(L∗m − Lg). Workers can now be in one of four cases:
1. Stay at home and do not participate: U00 = f(T )
2. Migrate and do not participate: U10 = f(T − L∗m) + (wm − cv)L∗m − cf
3. Stay at home and participate: U01 = f(T − Lg) + wgLg
4. Migrate and participate: U11 = f(T − L∗m) + (wm − cv)(L∗m − Lg) + wgLg − cf
As we saw in the previous section, the employment guarantee may aﬀect migration on the
intensive and the extensive margin. The intensive margin is driven by workers who both
migrate and participate in the program during the same season. For them the daily wage
on the program must be higher than the opportunity cost of time (wm − cv):
wm − cv < wg
The extensive margin response is driven by workers who would otherwise migrate but decide
to stay home and work for the NREGA. For them, NREGA participation reduces migration
duration so much that it is no longer proﬁtable to pay the ﬁxed cost of migrating:
f(T − L∗m) + (wm − cv)(L∗m − Lg)− f(T − Lg) < cf < f(T − L∗m) + (wm − cv)L∗m − f(T )
13A more sophisticated model would allow migrants to choose how long they migrate based on actual, and
not expected earnings. It would be the case for example if migrants cut short migration trips in which they
earn less than expected. This would lead to a positive relationship between migration duration and earnings,
which we do not see in the data (Appendix Figure A.2). For this reason, we keep to a simpler formulation
and assume that both decisions of whether and how long to migrate are made at the same time.
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This is the opportunity cost eﬀect of income shocks on migration documented in the
literature (Bazzi, 2017; Kleemans, 2015). Theoretically, there could also be a wealth eﬀect,
with NREGA participation allowing workers to pay the ﬁxed cost of migration (Angelucci,
2015). The reduced form evidence suggests that the opportunity cost eﬀect dominates.
4.2 Structural Estimation
We next use our model to estimate the ﬁxed and the variable migration costs. We assume
that
f(L) = A log(L)
where A is a constant. This implies that the optimal migration duration is
L∗m =
A
(wm − cv)
We also assume that both migration costs cf and cv follow a normal distribution.
cf ∼ N (µf , σf ) ; cv ∼ N (µv, σv)
The mean and standard deviations of these two variables as well as the constant A are the
ﬁve structural parameters that we estimate. We use the method of simulated moments, in
which the ﬁve targeted moments are:
(i) the migration rate in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh villages.
(ii) the mean of the migration duration in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh villages.
(iii) the standard deviation of the migration duration in these villages.
(iv) the diﬀerence in the migration rate between Rajasthan villages and the others.
(v) the diﬀerence in the mean migration duration between Rajasthan villages and the
others.
We also test the robustness of our model and consider a sixth, untargeted moment: the
proportion of migrants who do or want NREGA work.
For the purpose of the simulation, we need to draw a migration wage wm and a NREGA
wage wg for each worker. As migration wage, we use earnings per day spent outside of the
village, to account for the possibility that migrants do not ﬁnd work every day, although
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in practice migrants work on average six days a week (Table 3). As NREGA wage, we use
earnings per day worked in the program. To predict the migration wage of workers who
did not migrate, and the NREGA wage of workers who did not participate in the program
we use a linear regression of daily migration earnings on individual, household and village
characteristics (see Appendix Table A.9).14
We also need to simulate the rationing rule, i.e. the way in which NREGA work (Lg) is
allocated across workers. Given a draw of wm, wg, cf , cv and A, the model predicts whether a
worker would migrate in the absence of the program. The model also predicts whether they
would like to participate in the NREGA, which is whenever the marginal value of their time
(wm − cv for migrants and f ′(T ) for non-migrants) is lower than the NREGA wage wg. We
assign to each worker who would like NREGA work a participation probability equal to the
participation rate we observe among workers who worked or would have liked to do NREGA
work. If the draw is favorable, we assign them a number of days equal to the observed
average number of days worked by program participants. We do these steps separately for
Rajasthan villages and villages in other states.
For each value of the parameters, the simulated moments are computed by averaging
across 100 simulations of the whole sample. We then ﬁnd the value of the parameters
that minimize the squared distance between population moments and simulated moments.
To increase precision, moments are weighted by the inverse of their variance across 1,000
bootstraps (each composed of 70 independent draws of entire villages). The estimates are
the values that minimize the weighted distance after 100 iterations of the genetic algorithm
written for R by (Scrucca, 2013). For inference, we use 100 bootstrapped samples, each
composed of 70 independent draws of entire villages. We report standard errors equal to the
standard deviation of the estimates over the bootstrapped samples adjusted for the number
of bootstraps. We also report 5 percent conﬁdence intervals equal to the 2.5th percentile
and the 97.5th percentile of the distribution of boostrapped estimates.
We estimate the model on simulated data to provide some sense on how and how well
the model is identiﬁed. First, Appendix Figure A.3 displays the objective function that is
minimized, the squared distance between simulated and actual moments weighted by the
inverse of their variance, and how it changes when one parameter changes holding the others
constant. For each parameter, the objective function is convex, and the model estimates
are the global minimum. Second, Appendix Figure A.3 shows how the simulated moments
respond to changes in each parameter, holding the others constant. There is not a one-to-one
14The construction of these variables is described in detail in Section 2.4 and Appendix A.
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mapping between moments and parameters, but every moment endogeneously respond when
each parameter varies. The migration rate and duration are mostly related to the average
costs of migration (ﬂow and ﬁxed) and home productivity. Interestingly, the migration rate
is a decreasing function of the ﬂow and the ﬁxed costs (and the home productivity), whereas
the migration duration is decreasing in the ﬂow cost but increasing in the ﬁxed cost, due to
a selection eﬀect. As expected, the key moments for the identiﬁcation of all parameters are
the diﬀerence in the migration rate and the average migration duration between Rajasthan
and non-Rajasthan villages.
4.3 Results
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation. The estimated mean of the ﬂow cost of mi-
gration is large, Rs. 80, which represents 80 percent of earnings per day spent at destination
(Rs. 101 on average). It is precisely estimated: the 5 percent conﬁdence interval ranges from
Rs. 76 to 86. In contrast, our estimate of the mean of the ﬁxed cost of migration seems
relatively small, Rs. 480 or 8.5 percent of average migration earnings for a whole trip (the
average trip duration is 60 days). The conﬁdence interval for the ﬁxed cost is wider, from
Rs. 302 to 804, but even the higher bound is only 14 percent of average migration earn-
ings. The estimated standard deviation of these costs are large, which suggests substantial
individual heterogeneity: the estimated standard deviation for the ﬁxed cost of migration is
1733, which is more than three times the mean. Finally the constant A in the production
function is equal to 1602.
In order to test the goodness-of-ﬁt of the model, columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 compare
the empirical moments with the simulated moments based on our main estimates. The only
noticeable diﬀerence is that the simulated migration rate in Rajasthan villages is slightly
higher than the actual migration rate, so that the simulated diﬀerence with the other states
(−0.61 p.p) is lower than the actual diﬀerence (−0.84 p.p). It could be that a richer model
that would take into account complementarities in migration decisions betwee individuals
would predict a larger decrease in the migration rate: 71 percent of migrants in the summer
2009 migrated with a household member (Table 3). Overall, however, the ﬁt of the model is
very good for the targeted moments as well as for the sixth (untargeted) moment, the high
demand for NREGA work among migrants.
Based on our structural estimates, we can also simulate migration rates and migration
duration in two counterfactual scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, workers who want NREGA
work are oﬀered their legal entitlement of 100 days per household (we divide 100 days by
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the number of household members who want NREGA work). As column 4 in table 7 shows,
as compared to actual migration patterns, the migration rate declines from 39 percent to
27 percent and the migration duration drops from 61 to 46 days. As a benchmark, we
simulate a second scenario in which no NREGA work is provided (column 5). The migration
rate is essentially the same as the one observed in non-Rajasthan villages (39 percent), and
the migration duration is only slighlty higher (66 days). Comparing columns 4 and 5, our
counterfactual suggests that if it had been implemented as intended, NREGA would have
reduced both migration prevalence and migration duration by a bit less than a third, i.e. it
would have reduced total migration days by half.
The identiﬁcation of our model relies on the choice of a home production function, which
we have assumed to be f(L) = A log(L). To assess the robustness of our estimates to this
particular choice, we estimate an alternative model in which assume instead that f(L) =
A
√
L. The estimates based on the alternative model are presented in Appendix Table A.10.
The point estimates are indeed diﬀerent: the estimated ﬂow cost mean is Rs. 63 (against
Rs. 80 with our main model) and the estimated ﬁxed cost mean is Rs. 280 (against Rs.
480 with our main model). They do not however aﬀect qualitatively our conclusions: the
ﬂow cost is large (as compared to daily earnings) and the ﬁxed cost is not (as compared
to total earnings). Appendix Table A.10 presents the moments simulated based on the
alternative model: the ﬁt is not good for the targeted nor the untargeted moments. Hence,
our preferred model seems better speciﬁed, and its results seem robust to the choice of the
production function.
4.4 Interpretation of the ﬁxed cost of migration
The ﬁrst surprising ﬁnding from our structural analysis is that the ﬁxed cost of migration
need not be very large: the mean estimate is Rs. 480, about 7 percent of total migration
earnings. We can quantify two components of this ﬁxed cost: transportation costs and
the risk premium. Survey responses suggest that transportation costs are indeed small:
the average migrant paid Rs. 116 to travel to destination, less than 2 percent of total
migration earnings (Table 3). Another source of utility cost associated with migration is
income risk: migrants may not ﬁnd work at destination or may have to work for lower wages
than expected. Bryan et al. (2014) argue the risk of failed migration is an important barrier
to seasonal migration during the hunger season in Bangladesh.
We can again leverage the richness of the survey data and use information on migration
earnings from repeated trips to estimate the idiosynchratic risk migrants are exposed to.
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Earnings are deﬁned as earnings per day away, to account for both the employment and
wage risks. We restrict the analysis to 435 migrants for whom we have earnings per day
away for both summers 2009 and 2010. Average daily earnings in the Summer 2009 are
Rs. 100. We then run a regression of earnings per season on season and migrant ﬁxed eﬀects
and estimate the standard deviation of the residuals, which is Rs. 25.15 We next use the
estimated mean and variance of migration earnings to compute the relative risk premium,
i.e. the amount one would need to give migrants at home to make them indiﬀerent between
migrating and not migrating, expressed as a fraction of daily migration earnings. For the sake
of the calibration, we assume a simple static relationship between consumption and income,
i.e. that migrants consume their income and cannot insure their consumption against income
shocks. If we further assume migrants' utility has constant relative risk aversion ρ then the
relative risk premium (RPP) can be approximated as a simple function of the mean µ̂ and
standard deviation σ̂ of daily migration earnings:
RRP ≈ ρσ̂
2
2µ̂2
≈ ρ
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The risk premium depends on the level of relative risk aversion. Even with very high levels
of relative risk aversion ρ = 5, the risk premium is only 15 percent of migration earnings.
For more moderate levels of risk aversion ρ = 2, which Bryan et al. (2014) argue match
the evidence on migration decisions relatively well, the risk premium is 6 percent. The risk
aversion parameters we consider here usually apply to variations in consumption, which for
the sake of the exercise we have assumed to be exactly equal to variations in income. Since
in reality migrants have diﬀerent ways of insuring their consumption against bad income
shocks (e.g. using informal risk sharing networks), the risk premium we compute should be
considered as an upper bound. Hence, our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that
the combination of low travel costs and moderate income risk may rationalize the small
estimated ﬁxed cost of migration.
4.5 Interpretation of the ﬂow cost of migration
The second striking ﬁnding of the structural estimation is that the ﬂow cost of migration
is very large. The ﬂow cost represents the utility cost of living and working one day in the
15Alternatively, we can use cross-sectional variation only and estimate idiosynchratic risk as the standard
deviation of the residuals of a regression of daily migration earnings in the Summer 2009 on workers char-
acteristics, migration history and village ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimated standard deviation is Rs. 29, close to,
but higher than our preferred estimate.
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city relative to one day at home. In particular, it includes diﬀerences in living costs: living
in urban areas is more expensive than living in the village, and migrants may need to pay
for goods they would get for free or cheaply at home. In order to evaluate what fraction
of the estimated ﬂow cost of migration can be explained by diﬀerences in living costs, we
consider three possible deﬂators for migration earnings. We ﬁrst follow Hnatkovska and
Lahiri (2013) and use the ratio of the urban poverty line in the state of destination to
the average rural poverty line in the three states of origin: Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and
Rajasthan (Planning Commission, 2009).16 This deﬂator is only valid if migrants have the
same consumption basket as poor urban residents, which is not true in our context, since
migrants expenditures at destination do not include housing (less than 2 percent declare
renting a room and 86 percent declare sleeping rough) or durable goods.
We next use the consumer expenditure module of the 2009-10 NSS Employment Unem-
ployment Survey to estimate the share of these expenditures in urban and rural areas of each
state. Speciﬁcally, we compute the share of food expenditures (S1), as well as the share of
non-durable and non-housing expenditures (S2) for the average rural and urban household
of each state.17 Let Pr denote the poverty line for households in rural areas of the states of
origin and Pu the urban poverty line of the states of destination. The three deﬂators are:
D1 =
Pu
Pr
, D2 =
Pu ∗ S1u + Pr ∗ (1− S1r )
Pr
and D3 =
Pu ∗ S2u + Pr ∗ (1− S2r )
Pr
For the migrants in our sample, the ﬁrst deﬂator is equal to 1.3 (sd 0.12), the second to
1.04 (sd 0.04) and the third to 1.13 (sd 0.09). According to the third deﬂator, the monetary
cost of living in the city is hence equal to 13 percent of migration earnings, or Rs. 13 per
day away, which is much smaller than the estimated ﬂow cost of migration (Rs. 80). This
suggests that the utility cost of one day away is mostly non-monetary. In the case of housing,
migrants seem to trade the monetary cost of accommodation for the non-monetary cost of
sleeping rough. The next section will try to provide more evidence on non-monetary costs
of migration.
16The consumer price index for agricultural laborer and for industrial workers collected by the Labour
Bureau, which are the oﬃcial deﬂators used for rural and urban areas respectively are useful to track
inﬂation but cannot be used for cross-sectional comparison.
17Appendix Table A.12 provides the full list of items included in these expenditures: non-durable and
non-housing expenditures include entertainement, medical expenditures, personal care, conveyance etc.
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4.6 Non-monetary costs of migration
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that migrating and living in the city imply high utility
costs, but that a only a small fraction of these costs is monetary. The disutility cost of
bivouacking for months in the city and leaving family behind is presumably also important,
but harder to quantify. In order to provide evidence on the non-monetary dimension of
migration costs, we regress actual or desired NREGA participation on migrant and trip
characteristics, controlling for migration and predicted NREGA earnings. Speciﬁcally, let
Did be a dummy variable set equal to one if individual i who migrated to destination d in
the summer 2009 did NREGA work or declared they would have liked to do NREGA work
in that season. Let wim and w
i
g denote migration and NREGA earnings respectively. Let
Xi denote a vector of migrant characteristics, including worker and household controls from
Table 1. Let Zd denote a vector of trip characteristics, including those from Table 3, as well
as crime and pollution levels at destination (see Appendix A for more detail). Let µS denote
state ﬁxed eﬀects. We estimate the following regression through probit, with standard errors
clustered at the village level:
Did = αm log(w
i
m) + αg log(w
i
g) + βXi + δZd + µS + εid
Table 8 presents the probit estimates (marginal eﬀects at the mean). As expected, we ﬁnd
that migrants who had higher earnings were less likely to want NREGA work. Two individual
characteristics have signiﬁcant eﬀects: age and education. We ﬁnd that migrants with some
education were more likely to want NREGA work than workers with no education, which
may be due to the fact that the non-monetary costs of migration are more important than
the monetary gains for more educated workers. The disutility of migration also increases
with age: migrants above 30 were more likely to want NREGA work. Only one household
characteristic has a signiﬁcant eﬀect: the disutility of migration was higher for migrants
from households who have electricity at home, which may make time in the village more
productive / attractive. Finally, we ﬁnd some evidence that amenities at destination matter:
the utility cost of migration was lower among migrants who went to an urban area, but was
higher among those who went to a destination where crime levels were relatively high.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the costs and beneﬁts of rural to urban migration in
developing countries. We study seasonal migrants who choose between construction work in
the city and on local public works, which provides a unique opportunity to observe the same
worker doing similar work in the village and in the city in the same season.
Using supply-side variation in employment provision on local public works across states
and seasons, we show that when more employment is available migrants are less likely to
leave the village, and make shorter trips to the city. This is despite the fact that daily
earnings from the program are 35 percent lower than migrants' earnings per day outside
of the village. We estimate migration costs structurally to ﬁt the reduced form. We ﬁnd
that the ﬁxed costs of migration are small (7 percent of total migration earnings): neither
transportation costs nor the risk of unemployment are large barriers to migration. The ﬂow
cost of migration on the other hand is large (80 percent of daily migration earnings). We
show that higher living costs in the city only explain a small share of the ﬂow costs, because
migrants consume very little at destination. We argue that the main barrier to migration in
this context are non-monetary costs of harsh living and working conditions in the city and
the non-monetary value of staying in the village.
Our ﬁndings have important implications for development policy. On the one hand, many
governments consider that migration has undesirable eﬀects for the migrants themselves, for
their communities of origin or their city (or country) of destination, and promote develop-
ment at origin as an alternative to migration. For example the new European Fund for
Sustainable Development's main objective is to tackle the root causes of migration from
Africa (European Parliament, 2017). Our results suggest that policies aimed at reducing
migration ﬂows do not need to fully compensate workers for the loss in potential migration
earnings to convince them to stay at home. On the other hand, economists tend to argue
that governments should in fact encourage mobility to urban areas, which would improve the
allocation of labor in the economy (Gollin et al., 2014; Kraay and McKenzie, 2014; Bryan
and Morten, 2017). Our results suggest that improving working and living conditions for
migrants in urban areas may go a long way towards this aim.
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Figure 1: Cross-state variation in public employment provision
Figure 2: Seasonality of public employment provision
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Figure 3: Seasonal out-migration rates in India and in the survey sample
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Figure 4: Destinations of seasonal migrants in the summer 2009
(a) Rajasthan Villages (b) Madhya Pradesh Villages
(c) Gujarat Villages (d) All Villages
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Table 1: Village Characteristics
MP or Gujarat Rajasthan P-value
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Matching variables
Population Share Scheduled Castes 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.62
Population Share Scheduled Tribes 0.97 (0.15) 0.96 (0.13) 0.83
Total Culturable Land 185 (115) 189 (133) 0.92
Share of Culturable Land Irrigated 0.26 (0.19) 0.26 (0.2) 0.94
Share of Culturable Land Non-irrigated 0.56 (0.2) 0.59 (0.2) 0.59
Population per ha of Culturable Land 4.24 (1.42) 4.16 (1.42) 0.81
Panel B: Village controls
Total Population 1090 (786) 1071 (890) 0.93
Population Literate 0.36 (0.13) 0.37 (0.09) 0.54
Education Facility 1.00 (0) 0.77 (0.42) 0.00
Drinking Facility 1.00 (0) 0.95 (0.23) 0.16
Medical Facility 0.15 (0.35) 0.17 (0.37) 0.81
Paved Road 0.84 (0.37) 0.89 (0.32) 0.53
Bus Service? 0.47 (0.5) 0.27 (0.44) 0.09
Post and Telecommunication Facility? 0.11 (0.31) 0.19 (0.39) 0.37
Distance to Town (km) 30.93 (17.83) 31.74 (19.57) 0.86
Panel C: Household controls
Number of Adults 5.64 (3.48) 4.84 (1.95) 0.09
Number of Children (below 12) 3.26 (2.45) 2.86 (2.03) 0.14
Hindu 0.78 (0.42) 0.90 (0.3) 0.00
Scheduled Tribes 0.91 (0.29) 0.88 (0.33) 0.56
House with Kuccha Roof 0.35 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.52
House with Dirt Floor 0.93 (0.26) 0.88 (0.33) 0.20
Owns Cell Phone 0.43 (0.5) 0.37 (0.48) 0.33
House with Electricity 0.39 (0.49) 0.23 (0.42) 0.03
Main Income Source is Farming 0.48 (0.5) 0.52 (0.5) 0.46
Panel D: Worker controls
Female 0.51 (0.5) 0.52 (0.5) 0.27
Primary Education 0.12 (0.33) 0.15 (0.35) 0.09
Education Beyond Primary 0.20 (0.4) 0.18 (0.39) 0.58
Age between 30 and 45 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.44) 0.46
Age higher than 45 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.67
Married 0.71 (0.46) 0.70 (0.46) 0.83
Speaks Gujarati 0.37 (0.48) 0.08 (0.27) 0.00
Speaks Hindi 0.35 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.95
Number of villages 35 35
Note: Matching variables come from the Census 2001, village characteristics from the Census 2011, and
household and worker characteristics from the 2010 survey. MP stands for Madhya Pradesh. All village,
household and worker characteristics listed in this table are included as control in our main speciﬁcation.
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Table 2: NREGA work across states and seasons
Gujarat Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan Whole Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Summer (March-July 2009)
Worked for NREGA 10% 39% 50% 40%
NREGA days worked if participated 25.3 21.7 31.7 28.1
Wanted work but did not work 69% 42% 33% 42%
Did or wanted NREGA work 79% 82% 83% 82%
Migrated 34% 41% 30% 35%
Of which worked for NREGA 7% 36% 43% 35%
Of which wanted but did not work 80% 55% 46% 55%
Of which did or wanted NREGA work 87% 91% 89% 89%
Would have migrated if no NREGA work 3% 8% 10% 8%
Panel B: Monsoon (July-November 2009)
Worked for NREGA 0% 0% 1% 0%
NREGA days worked if participated 0.0 13.5 29.7 26.1
Wanted work but did not work 63% 50% 53% 53%
Did or wanted NREGA work 63% 51% 53% 54%
Migrated 18% 7% 9% 10%
Of which worked for NREGA 0% 0% 0% 0%
Of which wanted but did not work 72% 70% 74% 72%
Of which did or wanted NREGA work 72% 70% 74% 72%
Would have migrated if no NREGA work 0% 0% 0% 0%
Panel C: Winter (November 2009-March 2010)
Worked for NREGA 2% 10% 5% 6%
NREGA days worked if participated 21.5 16.1 20.1 18.0
Wanted work but did not work 73% 64% 71% 69%
Did or wanted NREGA work 75% 74% 76% 75%
Migrated 35% 28% 28% 29%
Of which worked for NREGA 2% 11% 4% 6%
Of which wanted but did not work 83% 78% 84% 82%
Of which did or wanted NREGA work 85% 88% 88% 87%
Would have migrated if no NREGA work 1% 2% 1% 2%
Adults 330 749 1145 2224
Source: Retrospective questions from the 2010 survey. The unit of observation is an adult.
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Table 3: Migration patterns
Own survey (2009-10) NSS 2007-08
Summer Monsoon Winter All India Sample districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrated? 35% 10% 29% 3% 16%
Observations (whole sample) 2224 2224 2224 188324 1937
Migrant is female 40% 33% 43% 14% 32%
Migrated with household member 71% 63% 74% 42% 81%
Destination is in same state 22% 33% 28% 53% 82%
Destination is urban 84% 88% 73% 68% 71%
Worked in construction 70% 70% 56% 42% 69%
Distance (km) 300 445 286 - -
Transportation cost (Rs) 116 144 107 - -
Number of trips 1.01 1.01 1.04 - -
Migration duration (days) 60 50 52 - -
Found employer after leaving 63% 64% 54% - -
No formal shelter in destination 86% 85% 83% - -
Days worked per week at destination 5666 4821 5109 - -
Total Migration Earnings (Rs) 6 6 6 - -
Earnings per day worked (Rs) 118 127 123 - -
Earnings per day away (Rs) 101 107 109
Observations (migrants only) 768 218 646 13411 327
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 present means based on the migration survey described in Section 2. The
unit of observation is a prime-age adult. Each column restricts the sample to responses for a par-
ticular season. Seasons are deﬁned as follows: summer from April to June, monsoon from July to
November, winter from December to March. Columns 4 and 5 present means based on the National
Sample Survey (NSS). In Column 4 the sample includes all rural adults. In Column 5 the sample
is restricted to adults living in the four districts of the migration survey sample. Information on
distance, migration duration, transportation cost, job search and accommodation at destination is
not collected by the NSS.
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Table 4: Eﬀect of NREGA on seasonal migration
NREGA Days Migration Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rajasthan -0.124 -0.301 -1.012 1.067
(0.121) (0.135) (1.014) (1.229)
Rajasthan x Summer 8.850 8.013 -5.255 -6.603
(0.642) (0.922) (1.257) (1.196)
Village Pair FE Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Season FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 6,650 6,650 6,666 6,666
Other States Outside Summer .67 .67 10.72 10.72
Other States in Summer 6.63 6.63 23.93 23.93
Migrated? Migration Days if Migrated
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Rajasthan -0.0123 0.00365 -1.669 2.472
(0.0139) (0.0160) (2.537) (3.526)
Rajasthan x Summer -0.0637 -0.0555 -5.526 -7.142
(0.0147) (0.0163) (2.450) (2.495)
Village Pair FE Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Season FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 6,672 6,672 1,626 1,626
Other States Outside Summer .2 .2 53.17 53.17
Other States in Summer .39 .39 62.07 62.07
Notes: The unit of observation is an adult in a given season. Results in Panel B are based on pairs of vil-
lages in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan only. Column 1 and 2 present results from a regression of days
spent working on the NREGA during a particular season on a set of explanatory variables. The outcome is
missing for 22 adults who did NREGA work in the season. In Column 3 and 4 the outcome is the number of
days spent away for work. It is missing for six individuals who migrated in this season. In Columns 5 and 6
the outcome is a dummy variable equal to one for adults who migrated during the season. In Columns 7 and
8 the outcome is the number of days spent away for work for adults who migrated. It is missing for adults
who did not migrate and for six individuals who did migrate. Rajasthan is a dummy variable for whether
the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan. Summer is a dummy variable for the summer months (mid-
March to mid-July) Other States Outside Summer is the mean of the outcome variable for the monsoon and
winter season in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. Other States in Summer is the outcome mean for
the summer months in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. Controls are the variables shown in Table 1.
Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
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Table 5: Wage Gaps
All Migrants Did not want Did NREGA Did or wanted
NREGA work work NREGA work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Daily Migration Earnings 100.9 118.0 98.8 98.9
(40.9) (48.5) (38.3) (39.5)
Daily NREGA Wage 63.7 64.6 63.0 63.6
(12.4) (11.4) (12.2) (12.5)
Diﬀerence 37% 46% 35% 35%
Observations 568 58 205 510
Note: The unit of observation is an adult. Daily Migration Earnings are equal to the ratio of earn-
ings from migration in the summer 2009 divided by the total number of days spent migrating in that
season. Daily NREGAWage is equal to the ratio of NREGA earnings in the summer 2009 divided by
the total number of days spent on NREGA works in that season. For migrants who did not work for
NREGA, Daily NREGA Wage is predicted using worker, village and household controls described
in Table 1 (see Appendix Table A5 for regression results). Column 1 uses the full sample of adults
who left the village during the summer 2009 and for whom migration earnings are known. Column
2 includes only migrants who have done NREGA work during the summer 2009. Column 3 includes
only migrants who have not done nor wanted to do NREGA work during the summer 2009. Column
4 includes only migrants who have done or wanted to do NREGA work during the summer 2009.
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Table 6: Structural Estimates
Flow Cost Fixed Cost Home
of Migration of Migration Productivity
Mean SD Mean SD Constant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimate 80.4 14.7 480 1733 1602
Average Estimate 80.2 17.9 537 1622 1716
Standard Error (2.7) (1.7) (127.8) (121.2) (217.7)
5% Conf. Interval [75.5;85.8] [14.6;21.5] [302;804] [1408;1902] [1313;2105]
Note: This table presents estimates from the method of simulated moments described in section
4.3. Average estimates, standard errors, and conﬁdence intervals (2.5th and 97.5th percentiles) are
computed using 100 bootstrapped samples composed of independent village draws.
Table 7: Model Fit and Counterfactuals
Targeted Actual Fitted 100 Days No NREGA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-Rajasthan villages
(i) Migration rate Yes 38.8% 39.9% 35.0% 29.9%
(ii) Average migration duration Yes 61.3 61.3 63.3 62.4
(iii) Standard deviation of duration Yes 32.4 28.6 30.2 32.9
Rajasthan vs other states
(iv) Diﬀerence in migration rate Yes -0.084 -0.061 -0.021 -0.023
(v) Diﬀerence in migration duration Yes -4.92 -5.57 -3.69 -1.63
All Migrants
(vi) % did or wanted NREGA work No 89.3% 87.6% 83.8% 89.1%
Note: This table presents six empirical moments. (i) is the migration rate in Madhya Pradesh or
Gujarat villages. (ii) is the average migration duration and (iii) is the standard deviation of the
migration duration in these villages. (iv) is the diﬀerence in migration rate and (v) is the diﬀerence
in average duration between Rajasthan villages and the other villages. (vi) is the proportion of mi-
grants who work or want to work for NREGA. Column 1 indicates which moments were targeted
in the estimation. Column 2 displays the moments observed in the data. Column 3 displays the
simulated moments based on the main estimates presented in Table 5. Column 4 presents counter-
factual moments if all workers who wanted work were given up to the legal entitlement of 100 days
per household. Column 5 presents the counterfactual moments if no NREGA work was provided.
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Table 8: Determinants of demand for NREGA work among migrants
Did or wanted NREGA work?
Coeﬃcient Standard Error
Log real daily migration earnings -0.0836 (0.0321)
Log NREGA wage -0.0487 (0.0686)
Female -0.00540 (0.0209)
Primary education 0.0536 (0.0152)
Education beyond primary -0.100 (0.0675)
Age 30 to 45 0.0631 (0.0168)
Age higher than 45 0.0379 (0.0304)
Married -0.0112 (0.0241)
Speaks Gujarati -0.00829 (0.0354)
Speaks Hindi -0.0296 (0.0348)
Number of adults 0.0141 (0.00674)
Number of children (below 12) -0.00397 (0.00609)
Hindu -0.00164 (0.0327)
Scheduled Tribes 0.0915 (0.0572)
HH has dirt ﬂoor 0.00371 (0.0392)
HH has cell phone -0.0177 (0.0224)
HH has electricity 0.0498 (0.0216)
HH main income source is farming 0.0196 (0.0218)
Migrated with household member -0.0267 (0.0214)
Destination is in same state -0.00632 (0.0347)
Destination is urban -0.0485 (0.0219)
Worked in construction -0.0111 (0.0269)
Found employer after leaving 0.0450 (0.0310)
No formal shelter at destination -0.0159 (0.0309)
Total crime per 1000 0.148 (0.0637)
Pollution SPM µg per m3 -0.00569 (0.0364)
Observations 546
State of Origin FE Yes
Note: The unit of observation is an adult. The sample includes only adults who were interviewed personally
and migrated in the summer 2009. We report marginal eﬀects at the mean from a separate probit estimation.
The outcome is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has done or said they would have liked to
do more NREGA work during the summer 2009. Worker controls and Household controls are described in
Table 1. Trip characteristics are described in Table 2. The city deﬂator is the ratio of the urban poverty line
in the state of destination to the average of rural poverty lines in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat.
Crime per 1000 is computed using the National Crime Records Bureau report in the state of destination for
2009. Pollution is measured as Suspended Particle Matter per cubic meter, which is reported at the city level
by the Central Pollution Control Board for the year 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
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A Appendix
A.1 Construction of Earnings Variables
Migration Earnings The survey instrument included questions about the frequency of
payment and the typical amount per pay period. In most cases (74 percent), respondents were
paid daily and in these cases we used the typical daily payment as earnings per day worked.
We also asked respondents how many days per week they typically worked. Respondents
worked on average six days per week and the median respondent worked six days. For
respondents who were paid weekly, fortnightly, or monthly, we used the reported payment
adjusted by the typical number of days per week worked. For example, a migrant paid 800
rupees weekly and working six days per week earns 800/6 = 133 rupees per day worked.
For migrants that were paid irregularly or in one lump sum at the end of work, we used
the total earnings from the trip divided by the number of days worked. For migrants with
missing values of days worked per week, we assumed they worked six days. Five percent of
respondents received payment in-kind for their work, being paid in wheat for example. We
leave these daily earnings observations as missing. For respondents with non-missing total
earnings (62 percent), earnings per day away was computed using total earnings divided by
days away. For respondents with missing total earnings, we used earnings per day worked
adjusted downwards using days worked per week away.
As discussed in Section 2.4, the survey recorded detailed information on the last four
trips only. Hence for adults who migrated in the summer 2009 but took more than four trips
afterward, we did not record information for any of the trips taken during summer 2009. Out
of 768 migrants, we have non-missing earnings for 593 migrants (77 percent). For migrants
with missing earnings, we construct linear predictions by projecting summer 2009 earnings
onto migration earnings in the following seasons (monsoon 2009, winter 2009 and summer
2010), individual and household controls (the list of controls is the same as in Panel C and
D of Table 1. The regression coeﬃcients are shown in appendix Table A.9. The mean of the
observed and the predicted migration earnings are Rs. 101 and Rs. 102 respectively, which
provides reassurance that the migrants with missing earnings are very similar to the other
migrants in terms of observable characteristics.
NREGA Earnings Out of the 895 adults who worked for the NREGA during summer 2009,
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32 (3.6 percent) report not having been paid in full at the time of the survey. Assuming a
wage of zero for those who were not paid yields a wage of 64.4 rupees per day compared with
67 for only those who were paid. For our estimation of migration costs, we need a measure of
daily earnings on NREGA that non-NREGA participants would expect to receive. For this,
we restrict our sample to the 238 adults who both migrated and did NREGA work in the
summer 2009 and we regress NREGA earnings on NREGA daily earnings for the following
season, individual and worker controls (see Panel C and D in Table 1). The regression esti-
mates are shown in appendix Table A.9. Interestingly, none of the predictors except summer
2010 NREGA daily earnings are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the NREGA wage
does not vary with productivity or observable characteristics. The R-square of the regression
is low, about 6 percent. In contrast, the R-square for the prediction of migration earnings
is 10 percent. We use these estimates to predict NREGA earnings for migrants who did
not participate to the program in the summer 2009. Again, mean predicted earnings are
extremely close to observed earnings, Rs. 96 and Rs. 101 respectively.
A.2 Destination Characteristics
In order to better understand the determinants of migrants' demand or NREGA work, we
use several sources of information on their destination.
Poverty lines First, we use poverty lines from (Planning Commission, 2009) to compute
deﬂators of migration earnings. Speciﬁcally, we compute the ratio of the urban poverty line
in the state of destination divided by the average of the rural poverty line in the three sample
states (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat).
Crime Second, we use information on total crime per 1000 inhabitants in the state of
destination in 2009 from the National Crime Records Bureau. We thank Nishith Prakash
for sharing the data (Prakash et al., 2014).
Pollution Third, we use an index of urban air pollution at the state level in 2010, Suspended
Particle Matter per cubic meter reported by the Central Pollution Control Board. We thank
Anant Sudarshan for sharing the data (Greenstone et al., 2015).
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Figure A.1: Diﬀerences in seasonal migration across states using retrospective questions
Figure A.2: Daily migration earnings as a function of migration duration
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Figure A.3: Model Identiﬁcation: Objective Function as a Function of the Parameters
(a) Flow Cost Mean (b) Flow Cost S.D.
(c) Fixed Cost Mean (d) Fixed Cost S.D.
(e) Home Productivity
Note: Simulated data. Each ﬁgure shows the objective function as a function of each param-
eter, holding the others constant at the value of the model estimates. The objective function
is the square of the distance between simulated and actual moments weighted by the inverse
variance of the moments. Vertical lines denote model estimates.41
Figure A.3: Model Identiﬁcation: Simulated Moments as a Function of the Parameters
(a) Flow Cost Mean (b) Flow Cost S.D.
(c) Fixed Cost Mean (d) Fixed Cost S.D.
(e) Home Productivity
Note: Simulated data. Each ﬁgure shows the simulated moments as a function of each
parameter, holding the others constant. Each moment is standardized by substracting and
dividing by the moment simulated at the value of the model estimates. Vertical lines denote
model estimates. 42
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Table A.2: Determinants of demand for NREGA work and migration
Did or wanted Migrated?
NREGA Work?
(1) (2)
Female -0.0331 -0.204
(0.0148) (0.0200)
Primary Education -0.0418 -0.0788
(0.0236) (0.0332)
Education Beyond Primary -0.152 -0.220
(0.0266) (0.0373)
Age 30 to 45 0.0356 -0.168
(0.0191) (0.0297)
Age higher than 45 -0.0765 -0.390
(0.0289) (0.0293)
Married 0.0913 0.0938
(0.0229) (0.0225)
Speaks Gujarati -0.00411 0.146
(0.0291) (0.0342)
Speaks Hindi -0.0383 0.0221
(0.0194) (0.0237)
Number of Adults 0.00499 -0.00326
(0.00490) (0.00556)
Number of Children (below 12) 0.000120 0.0133
(0.00483) (0.00613)
Hindu 0.0423 0.0915
(0.0265) (0.0267)
Scheduled Tribes 0.0332 -0.0600
(0.0361) (0.0337)
HH with Kuccha roof 0.0621 0.00371
(0.0206) (0.0255)
HH with dirt ﬂoor 0.0363 0.0869
(0.0450) (0.0353)
HH with cell phone -0.00854 -0.0328
(0.0215) (0.0240)
HH with electricity 0.0193 -0.00293
(0.0227) (0.0302)
HH whose main income source is farming 0.00385 -0.111
(0.0163) (0.0248)
Observations 2,224 2,224
Mean 0.820 0.350
Note: The unit of observation is an adult. In Column 1 the dependent variable is a dummy variable for
whether the individual has worked or would have wanted to work for the NREGA during the summer 2009.
In Column 2 the dependent variable is a dummy variable set equal to one if the individual migrated for work
during the summer 2009. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table A.3: Stated reason for not getting more work or not wanting more work
Summer 2009 Monsoon 2009 Winter 2009-10
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Full Sample
Wanted More NREGA Work 80% 75% 54%
Adults 2,224 2,224 2,224
Panel B: Reasons given by Adults Who Wanted More Work
Family Worked Maximum 100 days 3% 1% 0%
Works Finished/No Work Available 56% 79% 87%
No Program ID Card/Name Not on ID Card 6% 4% 7%
Oﬃcials Would not Provide More Work 18% 12% 8%
Too Young 1% 1% 2%
Too Old / Sick 3% 2% 1%
Other 15% 9% 6%
Adults 1,779 1,194 1,673
Panel C: Reasons given by Adults Who Did Not Want More Work
Working Outside the Village 18% 13% 5%
Other Work in Village 21% 30% 69%
Sick/injured/unable to work 29% 22% 11%
Pregnant / Needed to Take Care of Children 2% 3% 1%
Studying 21% 31% 17%
NREGA Does Not Pay Enough 4% 4% 1%
No Need for Work/Do Not Want to Do Manual Work 4% 2% 1%
Other 21% 11% 5%
Adults 445 1,030 551
Notes: The unit of observation is an adult. Each column restricts the sample to responses for a particular
season. Panel A includes all adults who completed the adult survey. Panel B restricts the sample to adults
who report wanting to work more for the NREGA during the season speciﬁed in the column heading. Panel
C restricts the same to adults who report not wanting to work more for the NREGA during the season
speciﬁed in the column heading.
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Table A.4: Eﬀect of the NREGA on seasonal migration including controls gradually
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: NREGA Days
Rajasthan -0.124 -0.124 -0.328 -0.235 -0.301 -0.323
(0.121) (0.121) (0.129) (0.135) (0.135) (0.139)
Rajasthan x Summer 8.850 8.850 8.346 7.723 8.013 7.618
(0.642) (0.642) (0.798) (0.810) (0.922) (0.770)
Observations 6,650 6,650 6,650 6,650 6,650 6,650
Other States Outside Summer .67 .67 .67 .67 .67 .67
Other States in Summer 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63 6.63
Panel B: Days Away
Rajasthan -1.012 -1.012 -0.905 -0.524 1.067 1.079
(1.014) (1.014) (1.164) (1.212) (1.229) (1.229)
Rajasthan x Summer -5.255 -5.255 -6.089 -5.792 -6.603 -6.726
(1.257) (1.257) (0.990) (1.126) (1.196) (1.212)
Observations 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666
Other States Outside Summer 10.72 10.72 10.72 10.72 10.72 10.72
Other States in Summer 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93 23.93
Panel C: Migrated?
Rajasthan -0.0123 -0.0123 -0.0275 -0.0218 0.00365 0.00204
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0160) (0.0157)
Rajasthan x Summer -0.0637 -0.0637 -0.0622 -0.0612 -0.0555 -0.0581
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0123) (0.0139) (0.0163) (0.0162)
Observations 6,672 6,672 6,672 6,672 6,672 6,672
Other States Outside Summer .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
Other States in Summer .39 .39 .39 .39 .39 .39
Panel D: Migration Days if Migrated
Rajasthan -1.669 -1.669 1.551 1.240 2.472 1.710
(2.537) (2.537) (2.689) (3.027) (3.526) (3.444)
Rajasthan x Summer -5.526 -5.526 -6.068 -4.378 -7.142 -6.592
(2.450) (2.450) (2.721) (2.698) (2.495) (2.470)
Observations 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626
Other States Outside Summer 53.17 53.17 53.17 53.17 53.17 53.17
Other States in Summer 62.07 62.07 62.07 62.07 62.07 62.07
Village Pair FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Worker Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Demand for NREGA No No No No No Yes
Notes: The unit of observation is an adult in a given season. Panel A present results from a regression of
days spent working on the NREGA during a particular season on a set of explanatory variables. The out-
come is missing for 22 observations. In Panel B the outcome is the number of days spent away for work.
The outcome is missing for 6 observations. In Panel C, the outcome is a dummy equal to one for adults who
migrated during the season. In Panel D the outcome is the number of days spent away from the village for
adults who migrated. It is missing for adults who did not migrate and for 6 adults who did. Rajasthan is
a dummy for whether the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan. Summer is a dummy for the summer
months (mid-March to mid-July). Control Mean is the mean of the outcome variable in villages which are
not in Rajasthan outside of the summer months. Village, Household and Worker Controls are described in
Table 1. Demand for NREGA is a dummy variable equal to one for individuals who either worked or wanted
work during the season. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
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Table A.5: Eﬀect of the NREGA on seasonal migration on common support
NREGA Days Migration Days Migrated? Migration Days
if Migrated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rajasthan -0.197 2.094 0.0140 4.008
(0.132) (1.514) (0.0187) (3.700)
Rajasthan x Summer 6.358 -5.947 -0.0548 -5.889
(0.854) (1.315) (0.0199) (2.439)
Village PairSeason FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ControlsSeason FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,123 5,138 5,142 1,281
Other States Outside Summer .62 10.7 .2 53.95
Other States in Summer 6.23 24.29 0.39 62.34
Notes: The unit of observation is an adult in a given season. The sample is restricted to observations for
which there was overlap in a propensity score for being in Rajasthan estimated using the controls in Table 1.
Column 1 presents results from a regression of days spent working on the NREGA during a particular sea-
son on a set of explanatory variables. The outcome is missing for 14 observations. In Column 2 the outcome
is the number of days spent away for work. It is missing for 3 observations. In Columns 3 the outcome is a
dummy variable for adults who migrated during the season. In Columns 4 the outcome is the number of days
spent away for work for adults who migrated. It is missing for adults who did not migrate and for 3 adults
who did migrate. Rajasthan is a dummy variable for whether the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan.
Summer is a dummy variable for the summer months (mid-March to mid-July) Other States Outside Sum-
mer is the mean of the outcome variable for the monsoon and winter season in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat
villages. Other States in Summer is the outcome mean for the summer months in Madhya Pradesh and Gu-
jarat villages. Controls are the variables shown in Table 1 Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
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Table A.6: Eﬀect of the NREGA on seasonal migration excluding Gujarat villages
NREGA Days Migration Days Migrated? Migration Days
if Migrated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rajasthan -0.378 -0.457 -0.00330 -0.872
(0.143) (1.144) (0.0145) (3.792)
Rajasthan x Summer 7.554 -8.382 -0.0903 -8.129
(1.108) (1.279) (0.0164) (3.286)
Village PairSeason FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ControlsSeason FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,714 4,725 4,728 1,105
Other States Outside Summer .85 8.80 .17 50.29
Other States in Summer 8.45 25.91 .4 63.66
Notes: The unit of observation is an adult in a given season. The sample is restricted to pairs of villages
in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan only. Column 1 presents results from a regression of days spent working
on the NREGA during a particular season on a set of explanatory variables. The outcome is missing for
14 observations. In Column 2 the outcome is the number of days spent away for work. It is missing for 3
observations. In Columns 3 the outcome is a dummy variable for adults who migrated during the season. In
Columns 4 the outcome is the number of days spent away for work for adults who migrated. It is missing for
adults who did not migrate and for 3 adults who did migrate. Rajasthan is a dummy variable for whether
the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan. Summer is a dummy variable for the summer months (mid-
March to mid-July) Other States Outside Summer is the mean of the outcome variable for the monsoon and
winter season in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. Other States in Summer is the outcome mean for
the summer months in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. Controls are the variables shown in Table 1
Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
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Table A.7: Eﬀect of the NREGA on seasonal migration (All Adults)
NREGA Days Migration Days Migrated? Migration Days
if Migrated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rajasthan -0.297 -1.141 -0.0132 -1.087
(0.130) (1.270) (0.0157) (3.218)
Rajasthan x Summer 6.969 -6.620 -0.0494 -5.415
(0.817) (1.119) (0.0145) (2.486)
Village PairSeason FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
ControlsSeason FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,144 8,126 8,166 2,179
Other States Outside Summer 0.57 14.71 .25 61.04
Other States in Summer 5.93 25.98 .41 65.25
Notes: The unit of observation is an adult in a given season. The sample includes all adults, including those
who could not be interviewed in person, and whose information was given by the household head. Column 1
presents results from a regression of days spent working on the NREGA during a particular season on a set
of explanatory variables. The outcome is missing for 22 observations. In Column 2 the outcome is the num-
ber of days spent away for work. It is missing for 40 observations. In Columns 3 the outcome is a dummy
variable for adults who migrated during the season. In Columns 4 the outcome is the number of days spent
away for work for adults who migrated. It is missing for adults who did not migrate and 40 who did. Ra-
jasthan is a dummy variable for whether the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan. Summer is a dummy
variable for the summer months (mid-March to mid-July) Other States Outside Summer is the mean of the
outcome variable for the monsoon and winter season in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. Other States
in Summer is the outcome mean for the summer months in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. Standard
errors are clustered at the village-level.
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Table A.8: Cross-state comparison of permanent migration in the last ﬁve years
Any Migrant Number of Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rajasthan 0.0293 0.102 0.0880 0.235
(0.0263) (0.0309) (0.133) (0.145)
Village Pair Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household and Village Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 702 702 702 702
Mean in Control .39 .39 1.23 1.23
Notes: The unit of observation is a household. Results in Panel B are based on pairs of villages in Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan only. In Column 1 and 2 the dependent variable a a dummy which equals one if any
member of the household left within the past ﬁve years. In Column 3 and 4 it is the number of household
members who left within the past ﬁve years. Controls include village and household controls presented in
Table 1. Mean in Control is the average outcome in non-Rajasthan villages. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
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Table A.9: Predictions of NREGA and migration earnings for migrants in the summer 2009
Daily NREGA earnings Daily Migration Earnings
Female -1.581 (1.319) -12.49 (3.555)
Primary education -2.035 (2.961) 7.671 (6.160)
Education beyond primary -0.547 (3.627) 2.366 (6.059)
Age 30 to 45 -1.490 (2.324) 7.067 (4.348)
Age higher than 45 -3.777 (2.546) -13.91 (4.665)
Married 0.759 (2.819) 0.206 (4.103)
Speaks Gujarati -1.971 (4.438) 4.709 (5.804)
Speaks Hindi 1.389 (2.654) -5.874 (4.037)
Number of adults -0.371 (0.550) 0.492 (0.975)
Number of Children (below 12) -0.00103 (0.733) -0.364 (1.103)
Hindu -4.296 (3.167) 3.838 (5.954)
Scheduled Tribes -1.240 (4.569) -6.692 (6.632)
HH has kuccha roof 0.220 (1.994) -3.143 (4.183)
HH has dirt ﬂoor -2.542 (5.093) 7.383 (5.997)
HH has cell phone -0.915 (2.838) 4.094 (4.721)
HH has electricity -0.201 (2.320) -7.218 (4.855)
HH main income source is farming -0.0245 (2.226) 1.264 (4.316)
Total Population 0.00490 (0.00340) -0.00645 (0.00557)
% Population Literate -27.19 (13.89) -32.11 (22.51)
Education Facility -8.568 (4.479) -8.021 (12.30)
Drinking water facility? 5.131 (4.993) 22.37 (16.56)
Medical facility? 0.656 (3.978) -7.225 (6.701)
Approach with paved road? -5.982 (4.535) 6.023 (7.717)
Bus Service? -5.592 (2.828) 2.319 (6.858)
Post and telecommunication facility? -0.888 (5.399) -6.156 (8.155)
Distance to Town (km) -0.0597 (0.0699) 0.00547 (0.180)
Observations 816 569
R-Square 0.062 0.103
Mean observed earnings 64.41 100.81
Mean predicted earnings 64.1 95.8
Notes: The unit of observation is an adult. In column 1 the sample is restricted to the 816 respondents who
worked for NREGA in the summer 2009, and for which information on NREGA earnings is available (20
respondents who did NREGA work have missing earnings). In column 2 the sample is restricted to the 569
respondents who migrated in the summer 2009 and for which information on migration earnings is available
(200 responsdents migrated and have missing earnings). The dependent variable are "Daily NREGA Earn-
ings", which is the ratio between NREGA earnings in the summer 2009 and the total number of days worked
on the program during that season and "Daily Migration Earnings", which is the ration between total mi-
gration earnings in the summer 2009 and the total number of days away for work during that season. "Mean
observed earnings" is the mean of the dependent variable for the regression sample, and "Mean predicted
earnings" is the mean of the linear prediction based on regression estimates for the whole sample. Standard
errors are clustered at the village-level and reported in parentheses.
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Table A.10: Structural Estimates: Alternative Utility Function
Flow Cost Fixed Cost Home
of Migration of Migration Productivity
Mean SD Mean SD Constant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimate 63.0 20.6 280 1063 407
Average Estimate 59.1 19.8 324 1280 434
Standard Error (7) (3.9) (128.8) (314.5) (63.8)
5% Conf. Interval [50.7;66.4] [12.4;26.2] [95;571] [363;1807] [347;539]
Note: This table presents estimates from the method of simulated moments described in section
4.3. Average estimates, standard errors, and conﬁdence intervals (2.5th and 97.5th percentiles) are
computed using 100 bootstrapped samples composed of independent village draws.
Table A.11: Model Fit and Counterfactuals: Alternative Utility Function
Targeted Actual Fitted 100 Days No NREGA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-Rajasthan villages
(i) Migration rate Yes 38.8% 39.9% 35.0% 29.9%
(ii) Average migration duration Yes 61.3 61.3 63.3 62.4
(iii) Standard deviation of duration Yes 32.4 28.6 30.2 32.9
Rajasthan vs other states
(iv) Diﬀerence in migration rate Yes -0.084 -0.069 - -
(v) Diﬀerence in migration duration Yes -4.92 2.43 - -
All Migrants
(vi) % did or wanted NREGA work No 89.3% 50.4% 47.0% 37.0%
Note: This table presents six empirical moments. (i) is the migration rate in Madhya Pradesh or
Gujarat villages. (ii) is the average migration duration and (iii) is the standard deviation of the
migration duration in these villages. (iv) is the diﬀerence in migration rate and (v) is the diﬀerence
in average duration between Rajasthan villages and the other villages. (vi) is the proportion of mi-
grants who work or want to work for NREGA. Column 1 indicates which moments were targeted
in the estimation. Column 2 displays the moments observed in the data. Column 3 displays the
simulated moments based on the main estimates presented in Table 5. Column 4 presents counter-
factual moments if all workers who wanted work were given up to the legal entitlement of 100 days
per household. Column 5 presents the counterfactual moments if no NREGA work was provided.
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Table A.12: Expenditure items in NSS Employment Unemployment Survey and construction
of urban deﬂators
Serial Number Expenditures Item In deﬂator with In deﬂator with
no durable or housing food only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 cereals & cereal products x x
2 pulses & pulse products x x
3 milk x x
4 milk products x x
5 edible oil and vanaspati x x
6 vegetables x x
7 fruits & nuts x x
8 egg, ﬁsh & meat x x
9 sugar x x
10 salt & spices x x
11 other food items x x
12 pan, tobacco & intoxicants x x
13 fuel & light x -
14 entertainment x -
15 personal care and eﬀects x -
16 toilet articles x -
17 sundry articles x -
18 consumer services excluding conveyance x -
19 conveyance x -
20 rent/ house rent - -
21 consumer taxes and cesses x -
22 medical expenses x -
24 medical (institutional) - -
25 tuition fees & other fees - -
26 school books & other educational articles - -
27 clothing and bedding - -
28 footwear - -
29 furniture and ﬁxtures - -
30 crockery & utensils - -
31 cooking and household appliances - -
32 goods for recreation - -
33 jewellery & ornaments - -
34 personal transport equipment - -
35 therapeutic appliances - -
36 other personal goods - -
37 repair and maintenance (of residential buildings) - -
Notes: This table presents expenditure categories in the "Household Consumer Expenditures" (Section 9)
of the 2009-10 NSS Employment Unemployment survey. Column 3 indicates which expenditure items are
included in the deﬂator used in Column 8 of Table 4, excludes durable and housing expenditures. Column
4 indicates which expenditure items are included in the deﬂator used in Column 7 of Table 4, which only
includes food expenditures.
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